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Abstract 
It has been argued that harmonization leads to a more effective delivery of aid to 
recipient countries, and ultimately to the target population and thus cooperation in 
general would be an adequate means to achieve this goal. However, the implementation 
of the Paris Agenda has so far progressed slowly. Vietnam is often reported as a case 
where cooperation between donors is working fine. By making use of the Institutional 
Analysis and Development framework developed by Elinor Ostrom, the question was 
answered what incentives cooperation among donor organizations in the case of 
Vietnam motivate? In order to explore relevant incentives for cooperation, qualitative 
interviews and a survey were conducted. It is the first study conducted in Vietnam about 
incentives for cooperation and the first study among development organizations that 
also includes intrinsic incentives, such as the personality of decision makers. Results 
encourage further research on four incentive clusters: trust and personality, an open and 
equal communication process to define expatiations before starting cooperation 
relationships, creating opportunities for knowledge exchange and guidelines and 
reporting mechanisms that support cooperation.   
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background and Research Question 
Since the adoption of the Paris Agenda for Aid Effectiveness in 2005 cooperation 
among donor organizations has been widely discussed under the umbrella of the 
concept of harmonization, one of five key concepts included in the Agenda. It has been 
argued that harmonization leads to a more effective delivery of aid to recipient 
countries, and ultimately to the target population and thus cooperation in general would 
be an adequate means to achieve this goal. 
However, the implementation of the Paris Agenda has so far progressed slowly. Several 
reasons have been brought forward. On the macro level some have argued that 
harmonizing aid would not be in the interest of donors as this would harm their position 
in relation to other donors. On the meso level, some have argued that implementation in 
donor organization is a tough task as established procedures are hard to change. And on 
the level of the individual it has been argued that the correct incentives are not yet in 
place to trigger cooperation. Thus, regardless of whether cooperation leads to more 
efficient aid delivery, cooperation still remains a challenge for donors.  
Internationally differing degrees of cooperation between donors can be observed, 
varying from sector to sector as well as from country to country. Vietnam has 
experienced an astonishing development over the last decades, particularly with regard 
to its economy and thus the associated reduction of poverty. Donors have only been 
active in Vietnam since the beginning of the 1990s, but since that time, both the number 
of donors and the quantity of aid to Vietnam have gradually increased. 
Despite the fact that the international framework for cooperation is valid in every 
country, Vietnam is often reported as a case where cooperation between donors is 
working fine. It could therefore be argued that Vietnam is experiencing a special 
situation. However, no study has yet been conducted that investigates the reasons for 
cooperation in Vietnam. It is therefore of interest to ask: What motivates cooperation 
among donor organizations in Vietnam?  
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This thesis will thus explore the motivational factors for cooperation among donors. It 
will attempt to close a gap in the literature, where so far no studies for the case of 
Vietnam have been conducted that put the individual in the centre of interest. The 
reality in aid organization has shown that decision makers in organizations have been 
able to make decisions about significant cooperation activities. It is assumed in the 
reminder of this thesis that they are the ones who can make a difference if only the 
incentives for them are right. 
To explore reasons for cooperation the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework will be used. This framework, developed among others by Elinor Ostrom, 
seems to be perfect to explore the case of Vietnam as it considers contextual factors as 
well as it allows for a analysis of incentives that structure the interaction between actors.  
The reminder of this text is structured as follows. First of all the IAD will be introduced 
and applied to donor cooperation. Secondly, the methodology that was used to explore 
the incentives will be summarized. Thirdly, the elements of the IAD will be applied to 
cooperation in Vietnam. Fourthly, the results will be discussed and hypothesis for 
further research will be developed.  
1.2 Contribution 
Whether harmonization of aid has a positive impact on the target group has been 
assessed in different contexts. Some have criticized the idea (e.g. Crespin 2006; Easterly 
2002; Eyben 2007) whereas others consider harmonization as beneficial for aid 
effectiveness (e.g. Dodd et al. 2009; Emmanuel 2010; Riddell 2007; Torsvik 2005; 
Sundewall et al. 2010).  
Much research has been conducted on the macro level of cooperation where different 
countries and their policies play a role. Fuchs et al. (2013) for example tested whether 
the competition for export markets and political support deters countries from 
coordinating when delivering aid. They use several indicators such as voting patterns in 
the UN and sector export structures to check their hypothesis. Countries tend to 
coordinate less when competing for exporting markets and political opinion may also be 
a factor, though to a lesser degree. In the case of the decentralization sector in 
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Indonesia, Winters (2012) concluded that the lack of coordination could be attributed to 
the strategic interests of the donors. 
Others focus on factors for within country coordination, thus focusing on the 
organizational level. In a quantitative study on coordination in Cambodia, Öhler (2013) 
finds a modest decree of coordination within the country. Especially bilateral seem not 
to coordinate among each other, whilst INGOs do cooperate to some extent. He 
concludes that “This suggests that aid continues to be regarded as a political or 
commercial tool in the competition among donor countries.” (Öhler 2013: 17).  
Others looked into explanations for different structures of donor networks. For instance, 
Atouba & Shumate (2010) found in a study of network patterns among INGOs and 
IGOs that collaboration of INGOs was most likely with other INGOs and that in 
general, organizations tended to collaborate more frequently with partners of partners 
than for them unknown organizations.  
Coyle & Lawson (2006) identify, among other reasons, a lack of training and high staff 
turnover in the World Bank as reasons for the lack of harmonization. The same 
conclusion in a different context can be found in Renzio et al. (2005). In summary, there 
have been almost no studies on cooperation among donor organizations which attempt 
to put the individual in the centre of interest. To date, studies which consider factors that 
are directly associated with the individual in donor organizations, such as personality or 
interpersonal trust, are missing in the literature. No studies have been conducted that 
explore incentives for cooperation in the case of Vietnam. 
Thus, the contributions of this research to the literature are twofold. It aims not only to 
contribute to the discussion on reasons for cooperation among donor organizations with 
putting the individual in the centre of interest, but also to contribute to the literature by 
exploring incentives for cooperation in Vietnam. Additionally it makes use of 
cooperation literature outside of development aid and thus makes a contribution to both 
fields of research by making a first attempt to cross the line for the case of Vietnam.  
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2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 Framework for Analysis 
So far, approaches have been based on structure-agency theory, asking whether the 
individual is responsible for his own behavior or whether the structure determines the 
behavior of the individual. However, an integration of both elements seems to be 
fruitful and thus this research is inspired by the Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) Framework, developed by Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom 1999: 46). Initially developed 
for research on collective-action situations, it has been widely used to answer questions 
about resource management and management of common pool resources. However, it 
has also been applied to other contexts (e.g. Klaas 2008; Christensen 2003).  
The IAD Framework in this context shall guide the research during the complex process 
of analysis by laying the ground work for theories on cooperation that are integrated 
into the basic structure of the framework. It will thus be adapted according to the 
research questions, whereby the framework will be reduced to its most important 
aspects. In a first step the framework will be summarized, then theoretical approaches to 
studying cooperation introduced after which a model specific to the case of Vietnam 
will be developed that explains cooperation using this framework and added theory.  
Figure 1 summarizes the set up of the framework. The context (external variables) 
structures the action arena, which result in outcomes that in turn feed back into the 
external variables.  
 
Figure 1: The IAD Framework  
(Source: Ostrom 1999) 
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Starting from the end point, outcomes are the result of interactions between actors. 
These interactions take place in an action arena. Action arenas are a construct and serve 
to identify the boundaries in which actions of actors take place. In order to be able to 
identify the structure in which actors operate, an analysis of action arenas includes the 
analysis of two aspects: The Actor and the action situation itself.  
The analysis of an individual who executes actions (actors) includes “[…] what and 
how actors value; what resources, information, and beliefs they have; their information-
processing capabilities; and the internal mechanisms they use to decide upon actions 
[...]” (Gibson 2005: 2.3.1). Ostrom (1999) emphasizes that an actor is usually perceived 
as ‘homo economicus’, because assumptions in this regard are best developed and 
therefore could be easily employed. However, other assumptions are valid and would 
depend on the action situation.   
Secondly the analysis of an action situation is of importance. Within action situations 
actors make decisions that lead to outcomes. An analysis of the situations includes a 
description about the following aspects (Ostrom 1999): 
1. a set of actors; 
2. the specific positions that can be filled by actors; 
3. allowable actions and how they are linked to outcomes; 
4. potential outcomes and how they are linked to sequences of actions; 
5. the extent of control actors have over choices; 
6. the information actors possess concerning the structure of the action situation;  
7. the costs and benefits that are assigned to actions and outcomes. 
Action situations and the actors that interact within these situations themselves are 
influenced in their actions by three contextual elements. Firstly, rules-in-use refer to the 
rules which govern the behavior of individuals, it explains what actions are required, 
prohibited or permitted (Ostrom 1999). The emphasize lies on ‘in-use’, because they 
can be both formalized and very informal. As people act, they can bring rules to live and 
these rules can get institutionalized. Also the opposite is possible: rules can also be 
‘unspoken rules’ that are known to everyone.   
Secondly, attribute of the community emphasizes the role of the community in which 
the interaction takes place. This includes socio-economic aspects as well as the 
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constitutional structure of the environment in which actions are taking place. Finally, 
the biophysical conditions refer to how “the world being acted upon effects the 
outcome” (Ostrom 1999). Each of the three contextual elements gains in importance, 
depending on the research questions asked.  
The behavior of actors in action arenas is structured by incentives. Incentives are 
defined as “the rewards and punishments that are perceived by individuals to be related 
to their actions and those of others.” (Ostrom 2002: xiv) and is defined as concept that 
only refers to external stimuli. The contextual elements that were mentioned above plus 
the assumptions about the actors themselves and characteristics of the action situation 
form the incentives and constraints within which actors behave. To sum up, incentives 
are basically every factor that can potentially motivate an action. They stem from the 
structure around the actor. Identifying them is a key for an institutional analysis that 
aims at predicting outcome or changing a given situation.  
Additionally, IAD can be applied on multiple levels. At each level the concept of action 
situations can be applied. The different levels are connected by the rules, where rules on 
a higher level directly influence action on the next level which directly result in rules. 
The lowest is the operational level where rules directly influence operational activities 
of individuals. One level above is the level of collective choice that directly affects the 
operational level. The constitutional level is the highest of all levels and influences the 
collective choice level (Ostrom 1999). The concept of multiple levels highlights that 
action situation cannot be imagined without an externally developed set of rules that 
incites actions.  
Those relations become obvious when applied to the case of cooperation in Vietnam, 
where the researchers aims to explore the motivators for cooperation among donor 
organizations (the outcome according to the IAD). Within the framework, incentives 
suitable to predict cooperation will be developed theoretically and employed in the 
empirical part of the research.  
The framework is a complex approach to the study of institutions and has been refined 
several times since its development. The researcher got the impression that it is still not 
yet finalized, even though a lot of literature exists. In the literature the framework is 
used more or less ‘loosely’ and important aspects are left out. However, this problem 
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seems to find its roots in the definition of the IAD.  For instance, statements are partly 
(seldom) not quite accurate, especially when it comes to the definition and interaction of 
institutions, incentives and rules. Definitions are neither clear nor definable. For 
instance, if one compares the definition of rules-in-use (actions that are required and 
prohibited) and incentives (rewards and punishments related to action), incentives 
appear only to be rules in use. Eventhough incentives play a dominant role in the work 
of IAD scholars, it has only been defined in later publications (e.g. Gibson (2005) and 
before in one sentence in Ostrom (2002)). However, they are a perfect concept to 
analyze the given situation.  
2.2 Literature Review of Literature about Cooperation 
In order to determine what motivates cooperation, this chapter reviews the existing 
literature on cooperation in general and development cooperation in particular in order 
to condense incentives that have been mentioned in the literature. The incentives that 
are listed here are perceived as theories about reality. If incentive A is in place, a certain 
action is the outcome in the framework of the IAD. It is therefore necessary that in a 
next step, findings from the literature review will be merged with the IAD framework in 
order to make use of its broader approach. 
The factors listed here are a ‘value as such’ and have been condensed by the respective 
authors. They are build on experience, empirical research or theoretical reasoning. Only 
measurable concepts were used in the reminder of this thesis. Some more complex 
concepts, such as good leadership (Casey 2007), which would require more detailed 
investigations and measurement, are not listed here. They are better investigated 
elsewhere. However, the complex reasoning they are based on will be employed in the 
analytical part of the thesis.  
The incentives that are found in the literature are grouped in two categories. Firstly, 
incentives that can be found within the actor itself (intrinsic incentives). Secondly, 
incentives that are part of the external structure of a person, extrinsic incentives. 
Literature referring to concepts such as cooperation, partnership, co-optation, inter-
organizational relationships and cluster of organizations was analysed. These concepts 
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are assumed to be synonyms, especially in view of the fact that no accepted definitions 
of each term exist and the definition of cooperation varies from person to person
1
.  
Table 1: Reviewed Literature about incentives for cooperation 
Author (Year) Intrinsic Incentives Extrinsic Incentives
Atouba & Shumate (2010)
*Exchange ties of ressources
*Reputation of organization
Casey (2007) Trust equality of partnership
Chen et al. (1998) culture
Coyle & Lawson (2006)
*Support of superior for cooperation
*cross-donor common guidelines
*correct disbursement policies
Fink & Kessler (2009) Trust
Lawson (2010)
*Enough time
*cooperation not part of performance 
review
Renzio et al. (2005)
*Peer recognition
*guidelines for cooperation
Sundewall et al. (2010) good personal relationship
Volk et al. (2011) Personality ('big five')  
Atouba & Shumate (2010) found that development organizations seek exchange ties so 
taht dependence on other development organizations is minimized. They wish to 
exchange their resources for the resources of the partnering organization and hope 
thereby to gain independence. Also, “organizations take on less risk when establishing 
direct ties with a partner’s partners” (Atouba & Shumate 2010: 297) because the 
organization is not totally unknown.  
For Casey (2007) trust is an important factor in why people choose to enter into closer 
cooperation relationships with their counterparts in other organizations.  For him trust is 
defined as a trusting relationship. He also states that “trust is so important that a reliance 
on trust could eliminate the need for formal contracts.” (Casey 2007: 76). Therefore if 
trust exists it motivates a closer relationship. He also adds the equality of a partnership 
as a success factor, if equality means power equity. This again incents a closer 
cooperation.    
The concept of culture as an important aspect of cooperation patterns is emphasized by 
Chen et al. (1998), who theoretically develop six different cooperation patterns, 
                                                 
1
 Please refer to Annex 1 for an analysis of a definition of cooperation among the participants in the 
questionnaire used in the framework of this study.  
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depending on the cultural background of individuals. The patterns differ according to 
their intensity, the use of telecommunication methods or reward structures.  
A comprehensive analysis of incentives for cooperation in the Worldbank by Coyle & 
Lawson (2006) finds that a good level of cooperation is fostered by the support of a 
superior in this area. Moreover, if common guidelines for all donors existed, everybody 
involved would act according to the same rules and cooperation would be easier. The 
same holds true for correct disbursement policies. The pressure to disburse money 
instead of considering cooperation as an integral part of the work, would undermine any 
efforts made with regard to cooperation.  
Fink & Kessler (2009) highlight the importance of trust for cooperation. However, their 
conceptualization differs from that of Casey. They define it as a maxim that determines 
actions of individuals, and call it maxim-based-trust. This could be perceived as an 
interpersonal trust intrinsic to every individual, compelling them to act in a certain way. 
Lawson (2010) points out that that those making decisions with regard to cooperation 
often have very little time available, rendering them less likely to cooperate. In addition, 
incorporating cooperation in the performance review has proven to be successful in 
motivating individuals to cooperate.  However, failing to include it results in a lack of 
career incentive for individuals to cooperate, compounding the problem. 
Other studies on incentives for cooperation in aid agencies by Renzio et al. (2005) point 
to factors such as acknowledgement among peers that cooperation is important. This 
goes hand in hand with support from the senior manager. Sundewall (2010) raises good 
personal relationships with counterparts as an important motivator for cooperation. 
Having a good relationship eases the process of cooperation. And Volk et al. (2011) 
highlight the personality of a person as an intrinsic factor that incites cooperation. Using 
the ‘Big-Five’ measurement scale, he concludes that agreeableness and prosocial 
behavior usually lead to more cooperation.  
The literature review demonstrates that researchers have identified incentives that can 
have a positive effect on cooperation. Whether these incentives can contribute to the 
discussion in the case of Vietnam will be investigated in the empirical part of this 
research.  
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2.3 A proposed Model for Donor Cooperation 
Collective Action Situations are becoming collective problems if the actions chosen by 
actors don’t lead to the correct outcomes (Gibson 2005). If these outcomes are not 
correct the incentives in place are not doing what they are supposed to do. In the last 
chapter literature was reviewed in order to identify some of these incentives that can 
motivate cooperation. They will now be integrated in the IAD framework and the 
framework applied to donor coordination. 
A first analysis concerns the actors in action arenas, their characteristics have to be 
analyzed. As already mentioned above, IAD scholars usually employ the assumption 
that individuals are homo economicus, thus act rationally with full information and clear 
strategies. “For many problems, it is useful to accept the view that an actor's choice of 
strategy in any particular situation depends on how he or she perceives and weighs the 
benefits and costs of various strategies […]” (Gibson 2005: 2.3.1). The researcher does 
agree with this view only partially. This view implies a material theory about reality: 
Only if something pays out he or she will act to receive the payment. Extrinsic 
incentives are thus of great importance as they constitute a reward (or punishment) for a 
certain action. 
However, the researcher does not assume that individuals act only upon extrinsic 
motivators or incentives. Rather, the classic separation between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation is assumed, where intrinsic motivation is defined as “[…] doing something 
because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable […]” (Ryan & Deci 2000: 55). Thus, 
the personality of a person is such a strong incentive that individuals are satisfied with 
an action if they act according to their personality structure and receive an intrinsic 
reward (or punishment). In this research the individual is therefore assumed to act 
opportunistically, not only according to his intrinsic motivation but also to his extrinsic 
motivation. If a certain decision must be made, the actor weights which option is the 
best for him. Not always in full possession of all information, actors usually can oversee 
the situation and act according to the payments (internal or external) one receives. 
In the case of Vietnam, actors that are of interest are decisions makers in bi- and 
multilateral donor organizations as well as International NGOs. It is assumed that it is 
them who make the decisions on whether to cooperate or not and whose actions can be 
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altered according to the incentives they are exposed to. They have good education, are 
experts in their field and of good physical health. All these factors give them the 
hypothetical chance to make rational decisions if only the incentives for them to act are 
correct. Additionally, the field of development aid is a competitive business area. The 
pressure to achieve certain objectives defined by their organization is high and jobs are 
rare. This situation forces the actors in question to defer to the rules of the game. This 
will be analyzed in the empirical part of the thesis.  
A second analysis refers to the action situation. Donors in Vietnam include bi- and 
multilateral donors as well as INGOs. It is assumed that the position of actors equals the 
position of the respective organization they are working for in the action situation. As 
donors are related to each other with a function of the resources they possess, the 
information they have about the structure and the extent of control they have over 
choices so are their employees that fill a responsible position and that were the ones 
questioned here. This position enables them, in the boundaries of the incentives from 
within their organization well as their intrinsic incentives, to act as a representative of 
their organization. This organizations however, and therefore the actors themselves, are 
bound by the contextual factors, the rules-in-use as well as the community.  
No formal structure whatsoever exists that can describe the relational structure of 
donors. However, they are quiet loosely associated, and different extents of interactions 
exist. Programmes are implemented in parallel structure and cooperation occurs under 
certain circumstances, as will be analyzed in this thesis. Basically, in the boundaries of 
rules-in-place donors are free to act as they please regarding cooperation. These rules in 
place are twofold. Firstly one has to consider the rules that are set up by the government 
of Vietnam and define allowable actions with regard to cooperation. Secondly, rules 
also include cooperation agreements, both formal and informal.  
In general, donors in Vietnam are organized in a market where every donor seeks to act 
according to its benefit and has full control over its actions. The just mentioned 
characteristics can be applied to the actual actors in the arena: the decision makers 
within the organizations. Thus, a market situation for actors in Vietnam exists where 
they are free to cooperate with other organizations as long as they follow the rules-in-
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use. Thus, it is about the intrinsic and extrinsic incentives for decision makers when and 
how donors in Vietnam cooperate.   
A framework for an analysis on the operational level that also includes some of the 
reviewed incentives looks as follows: 
 
Figure 2: IAD framework applied to donor cooperation in Vietnam 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Research Design 
Many authors stress that the fundamental difference between qualitative and 
quantitative research strategies is that quantitative strategies focus on testing theories 
whilst qualitative strategies generate them (Bryman 2012; Cresswell 2007; Yin 2009). 
According to Yin,  
“[…] case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions 
and not to populations or universes. […] and in doing a case study, your goal will 
be to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to 
enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization).” (2009: 33). 
Thus this case study can be perceived to be a qualitative research strategy. Yin (2009) 
defines case studies as an in depth investigation of a phenomenon within its context, 
where the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not evident. According to 
him, case studies are used when a large amount of data from different sources is 
necessary to provide evidence for a situation. In this process, theory guides the 
researcher through this complex situation.  
In this case, cooperation between donors occurs via a special and complex nexus of 
factors that also influence cooperation significantly (as will be evident later). 
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Furthermore, it appears to be necessary to gain a deep understanding of all the factors 
influencing cooperation in order to appreciate the whole complexity of the situation in 
Vietnam. Thus, experts were interviewed. Theory was used to guide the researcher 
through the complexity of the phenomenon: the variety of approaches to coordination 
and its definition and the different opinions on the incentives for cooperation. And 
finally quantifiable data was gained by use of a survey.  
Regarding data collection methods Gomm et al. (2000) defines a case study as opposed 
to the research design of the experiment and the social survey and Yin (2009) reports 
that surveys are not as commonly used as qualitative methods within case study designs. 
In this present case study, a survey was used in addition to qualitative research methods 
for two reasons: Firstly for triangulation reasons to enable findings to be checked 
against another source. And secondly so that the two methods can complement each 
other:  the survey is based on interviews and interviews can explain findings and 
relationships in the survey. In this study, data not only from a survey, but also from 
documents, interviews and participatory observation as well as inspiration from theory 
will be employed.  
The theoretical model developed in the last chapter can thereby be perceived as an ideal 
fit when using a case study. The large amount of data processed in this framework as 
well as the complexity of the situation and its context that will be analyzed suggests the 
use of a case study. Additionally, an action arena is in its essence a case that will be 
studied, where contextual factors influence the actions within the case.  
A summary of the research design is displayed in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Research design 
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3.2 Data Collection Methods 
3.2.1. Qualitative Interviews 
Qualitative interviews give us information about “[…] causal explanations participants 
provide for what they have experienced and believe and […] about the connections and 
relationships they see between particular events, phenomena, and beliefs.” (Mack et al. 
2005: 30). Thus they provide an opportunity to gain insights into phenomena that are 
otherwise hard to explore. In a semi-structured interview the researcher asks questions 
according to an interview guide. The sequence and the questions remain the same for 
every interview. However, he retains the flexibility to ask additional questions and to go 
into further detail should particularly interesting subjects arise. (Bryman 2012) 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted as they provided the researcher with the 
chance to confront the interviewees with observations made and ideas from the theory. 
During the field study an interview guide was developed on the basis of the theory and 
observations and interviews were held using the questions in the guide. Interviews were 
all digitally recorded in a quiet environment, mostly in the offices of interviewees. After 
the interview short notes were made on the interview and the quality. An ex-post 
analysis of the notes revealed that all interviews were of high quality save one, where 
noise level and external disturbance was quite high.  
During the interview the researcher made use of several questioning types (as suggested 
by Bryman 2012) and tried to avoid others, for instance suggestive questioning. Usually 
all questions from the guide could be asked and the interviews were ultimately less 
structured than intended. This allowed many other aspects to be revealed which were 
not covered in the theory and were used later in the survey. Lastly, earlier interviews 
tended to influence later interviews, so that e.g. concepts that were brought up earlier 
could be discussed with the next interviewees. This enriched this research. 
3.2.2. Online Survey 
Online surveys can be perceived as a form of self-completion questionnaires (Bryman 
2012) and accordingly they are said to be quicker and cheaper to administer than other 
forms of data collection methods. More importantly, interviewer effects are absent and 
interviewer variability is reduced, leading to more standardization and thus a better 
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comparability of results. On the other hand, it is difficult to explain questions to 
interviewees if they have difficulties in answering questions and one cannot ask many 
questions as respondents cannot be directly motivated to continue. While negative 
aspects especially associated with online surveys include lower response rates and non-
controllable responses, meaning that people can answer several times, positive aspects 
include faster responses and fewer unanswered questions.  
To mitigate negative aspects, specific texts were used throughout the survey to describe 
the instruments in detail and to avoid unclear situations for the respondent (see Annex 3 
for the questionnaire). Furthermore, the number of questions was reduced to a minimum 
to keep attention to the study constant. Also, no graphical progress indicator was used to 
indicate how many questions were left. Rather, verbal indicators were included to 
motivate participants as they are said to increase completion rates and therefore 
responses (Best & Krueger: 2008).  In addition, special emphasis was put on the 
sequence and phrasing of questions: sensitive questions were put last in the survey, 
interesting ones at the beginning, some concepts had to be introduced first through 
another question before they could be used more in details (e.g. questions about the 
cooperation intensity), questions had to be formulated carefully so as not to provoke or 
suggest answers, and also items had to be grouped into thematic sections so there was a 
logical progression for the reader (Alreck & Settle 1985; Cargan 2007).  
3.2.3. Participant Observations 
One of the main advantages of participant observation is that the researcher can “see as 
others see”. That is that the implicit features of social life are revealed to the researcher 
more easily if he is at the focus of his interest and the units of interest are in their natural 
settings (Bryman 2012: 338). However, the researcher is very restricted to certain 
people and places and in this case he was restricted to one organization and the 
interactions of people there. 
Thus, this study benefits from observations during interviews, private chats and the 
researcher’s field placement in one donor organization. During his observation the 
researcher was always clear about his research to his colleagues and thus experienced 
no rejection or critique. However, he never actively spoke about the topic and only 
answered when he was asked about his research topic. Notes were made in Vietnam and 
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later used as a basis for this thesis. This form of data collection was a great source of 
inspiration at every stage of the research process.   
3.3 Sample Design 
The population from which the sample is drawn is specified as all decision makers in 
international donor organizations in Vietnam:  bilateral and multilateral donors, as well 
as International Non Governmental Organizations. Decision makers are all persons that 
can theoretically make a decision about whether or not to engage in cooperation.  
However, no data is available about the number of staff in these donor organizations, 
especially considering that not all staff are authorized to engage in cooperation activities 
with other donors.  
However, concrete figures or at least contact information for these persons would be 
necessary to frame the sample. Therefore, a probability sampling is not possible as no 
sample frame exists from which units could be drawn. In a probability sampling every 
single individual from the population being examined has a statistically and (more 
importantly) determinable chance greater than zero of being involved in the survey 
(Bryman 2012). In view of the unclear data situation about staff of donor organizations 
in Vietnam this was not possible. Thus, for qualitative and survey data collection, 
different non-probability, non-representative sampling methods were used.  
Qualitative interviews were held in Hanoi, Vietnam with representatives from eight 
donor organizations from September to November 2012. Different donor organizations 
were contacted so that a wide array of criterion could be covered, which theoretically 
could influence forms of cooperation and therefore had to be investigated. The 
organizations contacted in the so called purposive criteria sample (Bryman 2012) were 
chosen with the help of a neutral employee of a donor organization, who provided 
contact information so that all characteristics important for the study were covered. Of 
17 inquiries, 9 positively answered and ultimately 8 interviews could be held (response 
rate of 47%). Table 2 lists the institutions represented in the sample according to the 
criterion. The sample size is therefore large enough to represent possible combinations. 
Though not representative, it was possible to capture a broad picture through the 
interviews.  
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Table 2: Interviewed organizations according to characteristics 
ADB CENTEC
Finnish 
Embassy GIZ JICA
NGO 
Ressource 
Center UN Women World Vision
Kind of organization NGO X X
UN Organization X
Bilateral Donor X X X X
International Bank X
Size small X X X
medium X X
big X X X X X
Paradigm religious X X
secular X X X X X X X
Background Asian X
American X
European X X X
International X X X  
To gain as many responses as possible for the survey two strategies were used. Firstly, 
the persons with whom qualitative interviews were conducted were sent the survey by 
mail with the request to fill it in themselves and distribute it among their peers. 
Secondly, the survey was sent to all organizations that were known to the researcher as 
mentioned above, excluding the ones already covered by step one. These organizations 
were contacted using their central mail address. It was not possible to control to which 
person the mail was forwarded to within the organization, how many persons within the 
organization actually received and read the mail, and to whom the interviewees 
forwarded the mail. Thus, it is hard to determine the probability of a unit getting into the 
survey and a probability sample was not possible. Therefore a snowball sampling 
method was applied (Bryman 2012).  
The questionnaire was developed using an online tool
2
 based on the theory and the both 
the interviews and the observations of the researcher were held in Hanoi. Items were 
developed and partly borrowed from other sources. The items were compiled and the 
online survey was sent to the sample by mail. The survey period was from 15
th
 of April 
until 8
th
 of May. Response rate was not calculable due to the nature of a snowball 
sampling, but 13 persons responded out of about 160 persons and organizations that 
were initially contacted. Table 3 displays the sample according to some characteristics. 
                                                 
2
 The online tool is called limeservice (www.limeservice.com/), which is based on LimeSurvey, an open 
source and free survey software. Limeservice offers the customer an online solution of the software. The 
user can buy answers (0.09€ per answer) and the so raised money directly goes into the future 
development of LimeSurvey.  
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Table 3: Persons in the survey according to characteristics 
Organization Type INGO 5
Bilateral 6
Bank 1
UN 1
Sex Female 5
Male 8
Origin of Respondent Europe 6
North America 2
Asia 5  
3.4 Data Analysis 
Data analysis of interviews and the survey was conducted with software tools. A coding 
scheme was developed for the qualitative interviews (see Annex 2) on the basis of 
theory and observations. The scheme was used to code the interviews using the tool 
MAXQDA. The programme allows the researcher to attribute parts of text to a code. 
Different themes in a text can be aggregated and thus the text is made easier to analyze. 
The information gained in this way is used throughout the analysis in the form of text 
with an indication of frequency. 
The data gained from the survey was exported to an SPSS compatible file, cleaned and 
analyzed using the software tool IBM SPSS Statistics 21. SPSS allows the researcher to 
tabulate variables against units, aggregate data and explore and describe the data. This 
includes measures of univariate and multivariate analysis. The findings are reported in 
the form of tables and figures in this research as well as in the text.   
3.5 Ethical Considerations 
Research and researcher ethics is of great importance to any research conducted. Only 
by these standards can research constitute its position in society and serve a higher need. 
In Sweden one can find comprehensive information about research ethics in the 
publication “Good Research Practice” by the Swedish Research Council (VR 2011), in 
the UK from the British Sociological Association (2002) and the Social Research 
Association (2003). Generally they all have in common that protecting personal data 
(anonymity and confidentially) as well as obtaining informed consent are crucial for any 
research in the social science in order to do no harm to the participants. 
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3.5.1. Online Survey 
However, the way these issues are treated varies for online surveys (Eynon 2008): In 
online surveys it is easy to collect behavioral data, such as clicks per minute and time 
taken to complete the survey as easy as it is to collect IP addresses without the 
participant’s knowledge. Therefore, it is necessary to either gain informed consent for 
this unconscious data collection or not collect it at all, as it was done in the survey for 
this research, in the case of the IP address also in order to guarantee anonymity. 
Furthermore, the participants were informed of the aim of the study, how the findings 
would be used and it was clear to the participants that they could interrupt and clear the 
questionnaire at any time by pressing a button. Furthermore, one has to keep in mind 
that the participants all have university degrees, working in a business that often works 
with questionnaires and therefore in all probability have a good awareness of the risks 
and advantages involved in participating in a survey. 
The protection of personal data raises the issues of privacy and the way in which data is 
stored. Regarding the collection of the data it was the aim of the researcher to respect 
the people’s privacy and to write them only one mail, asking them to complete the 
survey. This was followed by one reminder 5 days after the first contact, regardless of 
whether they completed the survey or not, as this could not be checked. With regard to 
data storage of personal data, the privacy policy of the hosting company of the survey 
was checked against eight criteria suggested by Charlesworth (2008)
3
 and derived from 
the UK data policies in order to guarantee confidentiality. The policy of the hosting 
company is in line with these principles, e.g. the servers are located in Germany and 
data will not be stored after deletion of the survey. After completion of the survey the 
data was stored on the personal laptop of the researcher in a password protected file.   
3.5.2. Qualitative Interviews 
Regarding anonymity the researcher assured the deletion of names in the interviewing 
documents. Also, all information was deleted from any documents that could be related 
                                                 
3
 The criteria require „[…] that data must be: fairly and lawfully processed, processed for limited 
purposes, adequate, relevant and not excessive, accurate and up to date, not kept longer than necessary, 
processed in accordance with the individual's rights, kept securely, not transferred to countries outside the 
European Economic Area unless the country in question has adequate protection for individual privacy.” 
(Charlesworth 2008: 4) 
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to the interviewee. In this thesis the organization is referred to rather than the 
interviewee. For confidentially reasons documents are stored in a safe place on the 
private laptop of the researcher.  
As was also the case for the survey, the interviewee was informed about the aim of the 
study and that he could withdraw from the situation at any given moment during the 
interview. Also the interviewee was asked whether it was acceptable for the researcher 
to record the interview. All participants agreed. Furthermore the researcher introduced 
himself and explained how this research would be used and that it was part of an 
academic assignment. The researcher felt that he owed the interviewees the promise that 
the research would at least be distributed among the participants as a thank you for the 
time they spent talking about this topic.  
3.6 Quality Considerations 
Three types of validity can be differentiated (Yin 2003) and will be evaluated here with 
regard to the study. In general, validity is about the integrity of the conclusions that are 
derived from research. Firstly, construct validity refers to whether one really measures 
the concept one was intending to measure. Triangulation is an important strategy to 
avoid this trap and was used mainly in this study. Secondly, internal validity relates to 
whether the assumption that A leads to B holds true. In this research we have tried to 
gain internal validity through the strategy of explanation building that is the verbal 
development and description of the causalities based on propositions of theory. Thirdly 
external validity asks whether the research is generalizable beyond the specific research. 
As Yin (2003) mentioned it is the nature of a case study to be specific to a case and thus 
results are naturally generalizable only to theory and not to other cases. However, the 
contribution made to theory through a case study “[…] will help to identify the other 
cases to which the results are generalizable.” (Yin 2003: 60). Thus, if the theory is 
tested in circumstances where the research is replicable according to its hypothesis and 
holds true, also the findings of the first case are generalizable to this case.  
Lastly, reliability is about how the results of a case study can be repeated by other 
researchers and therefore concerns transparency and documentation of processes and 
results. The researcher of this study tries to make all steps of this research as transparent 
as possible and provides all necessary information to replicate this case. To do this, all 
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the data gained was collected and conceptualized and as much information as possible 
about the process is provided in this study (e.g. a coding scheme). This builds on a 
comprehensive documentation of all information gained. 
4. Context for Cooperation in Vietnam 
In this chapter the contextual factors for cooperation in Vietnam are analyzed. The 
researcher particularly emphasizes two of the context variables. Firstly the ‘rules-in-
use’, which in this case mainly concerns the framework for cooperation internationally 
as well as in Vietnam. And the attributes of the community, or more specifically the 
socio-economical and cultural background to Vietnam.  
4.1 The community: Political, Social and Economical Development in Vietnam 
In the centuries before its independence from France in 1945, Vietnam had strong ties to 
Japan as well as to China, sometimes violent and sometimes peaceful. After 1945, Ho 
Chi Minh gained power and Vietnam was declared the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam. The First Indochina War between France and Vietnam begun and lasted until 
1954 with heavy involvement of different interest groups within Vietnam. Left a 
divided country after the Geneva Conference, Vietnam was not far away the clash 
between the communist North and the US supported South in the Second Indochina 
War from 1955 until 1975. This war led to about 1,000,000 deaths on the Vietnamese 
side in the years 1965 to 1975 and many others were left altered by the use of Agent 
Orange and other chemical weapons (Hirschman et al. 1995). There followed a long era 
of socialist governance with strong ties to the Soviet Union and a difficult relationship 
with China. This time was also interrupted by two wars, one with China in 1979 and 
one with Cambodia in the late 1970s. After several wars in the 20
th
 century, Vietnam 
started liberalizing its economy away from planned economy, a process known as Doi 
Moi, in the late 1980s. It also opened up its economy to other countries, including the 
US.    
However, there has been little progress made with regard to political liberalization and 
freedom. In its political rights index, Freedom House (2013) rates countries on a scale 
from 1 for “free” up to 7 for “not free”.  For 2012, Vietnam was awarded a 7 for 
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political rights and a 5 for Civil Liberties. In the World Bank (2013) “CPIA 
transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating”, an index on 
transparency, accountability and vested interests in the public administration, Vietnam 
is ranked with a 3, where 1 is low and a 6 would mean high corruption. This of course 
has implications for working within the country, with the Civil Society and with state 
actors, as will be analyzed further down. 
Acuna-Alfaro (2011) for instance reports that in a study among civil servants in 
Vietnam (n=14,108) 70% report that their salary is not sufficient to live on and that thus 
31% use their positions to receive extra money and 35% would do work not related to 
their position to earn extra money. Additionally, training of civil servants is reported as 
being “largely ineffective”. The same report also states that the promotion system is 
regulated through bribery, meaning that jobs have to be bought in order to be promoted. 
According to them, this is also a reason why personnel in decision-making positions is 
often unqualified and others that are qualified are leaving public services. (Poon et al. 
2009)   
According to the WB (2013) population growth in Vietnam remains at around 1% over 
the last years and the population totalled 88 million in 2012, compared to 55 million in 
1982. Of this population 70% are of working age, of which only 2% are officially 
unemployed. Secondary school enrollment rates are at 77%, compared to 57% in 1998. 
In the same period tertiary enrollment rates grew from 10% to 25%. Regarding the 
economic development, GDP has grown around 5% on average over the last 20 years, 
increasing from around 150 Dollars in 1990 to over 1,400 in 2011 (compare Figure 4 
further down in the text). This significant increase has had a significant impact on the 
environment.  For instance, BOD pollution, an indicator for organic pollution of water 
surfaces, doubled between 1998 and 2008. CO2  emissions in metric tons per capita 
tripled in the same period. 
4.2 Rules-in-use: International and National Framework for Cooperation 
One of the main international treaties that concerns coordination of donors is the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In order to make aid more effective it outlines five 
core principles: ownership, alignment, harmonization, results, and mutual 
accountability. Accompanied by measurable indicators and periodically audited, the 
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Agenda aimed to be one of the most sophisticated norms for action in the development 
sector so far. With regard to the principle of harmonization, donors agreed upon: more 
common arrangements at country level for planning, funding, disbursement, monitoring, 
evaluating and reporting; more joint missions to avoid duplication; more division of 
labor between donors, simultaneously more leadership in core areas; better 
organizational internal procedures and incentives for staff in order to harmonize 
(OECD: 2013b). 
The Hanoi Core Statement (CG 2005), a four page document, was developed by donors 
and the Vietnamese government in order to “[…] localise the conclusions of the High 
Level Forum on Aid effectiveness held in Paris in March 2005 ("The Paris 
Declaration") to reflect circumstances in Vietnam.”. It develops in all five dimensions 
of the Paris Declaration measurable indicators that are specific to Vietnam. So far, 
progress in the area of harmonization has been made, however the goals have not been 
achieved. For instance, in 2010 62% of all aid was programme based, 54% country 
analytical work was joint and only 17% of all donor missions were coordinated (OECD 
2013b). Even though this represents significant progress, it still falls short of the aims 
that were agreed on in the Hanoi Core Statement.  
Two broader approaches to harmonization of activities have been established. In order 
to accompany the implementation of the Hanoi Core Statement the Aid Effectiveness 
Forum (AEF) was established in 2010.  In this forum the government and donors 
mutually discuss the implementation of activities to make aid more effective (AEF 
2010). A second is the Consultative Group (CG) meetings and the corresponding 
thematic Development Partnership Groups.  The CG meetings used to be held twice a 
year but are now being held annually. They are attended by high-ranking representatives 
of almost all bi- and multilateral donors, representatives of INGOs and representatives 
from the Vietnamese government at a ministry level. The sub groups vary regarding 
their formality and the persons involved. They can be highly formal with representatives 
from all parties, including the government as well as highly informal with only donors 
present (Bartholomew & Lister 2005). CG meetings have an impact of the work of 
donors, that is that they help to facilitate information sharing (Interviewee 8). 
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As Interviewee 5 mentions, “Vietnam has been very effective in promoting Aid 
Effectiveness all the years, including last year’s High Level conference in Busan, which 
was thoroughly discussed and followed up by the Aid Effectiveness Forum in 
Vietnam”. In contrast, other interviewees point out that the rules of Aid Effectiveness 
are not mandatory and as a result, organizations would not follow these rules 
(Interviewee 3, Interviewee 4, and Interviewee 1). This would also have very specific 
reasons, such as the fact that organizing joint missions “and to come to a common 
agreement is an enormous headache” (Interviewee 1) and in the end it would all rely on 
the individuals and their willingness to cooperate (Interviewee 4). 
It is not the aim of this study to evaluate the Paris Agenda. But the before mentioned 
numbers show that cooperation, which is necessary to achieve any of the 
abovementioned aspects, has still not progressed as far as it should be according to the 
targeted objectives of donors. Although strong rules and platforms are in place (CG 
meetings, AE Forum, Hanoi Core Statement) and significant efforts are being made in 
order to harmonize, these efforts apparently rely on the initiative of individuals. So what 
stimulates cooperation at the individual level? 
4.2.1. Rules-in-use for Non Governmental Organizations 
NGOs really started to be active in Vietnam only in the late 1980s because of the US 
embargo which was followed by all donors except Sweden (NRC 2010). No official 
figures exist about the total number of NGOs in Vietnam today. The VUFO-NGO 
Resource Center (2013), an association of the largest NGOs in Vietnam, publishes the 
INGO Directory online which currently lists 132 NGOs as members. However, this list 
is probably biased as not all NGOs can pay membership fees or are willing to become a 
member of the center. In a publication from 2010 the Resource Center speaks of around 
900 NGOs that currently have relations with Vietnam, around 600 of them are active. In 
total, around 273 million US Dollar were being disbursed by INGOs in Vietnam in 2009 
(UN Women 2012).  
The VUFO-NGO Resource Center (NRC) is a joint institution of INGOs and the 
government of Vietnam that was established in 1993. The name VUFO stands for 
Vietnam Union of Friendship Organisations, which is a focal point established by the 
government to register and administer all NGOs. Though related very closely to the 
-32- 
government, the NRC perceives itself as the main bridge between INGOs and the rest of 
the development actors in Vietnam. Additionally they facilitate 18 intra-organizational 
thematic working groups and moderate different mailing lists for easy communication 
with on average 900 participants in the mailing lists. It has also been reported by one 
interviewee that the working groups are well respected expert groups and that their 
voice is heard at the government level. The Center also represents its members at 
several high level meetings, including the meetings of the CG and the Poverty 
Reduction Support Credit and in meetings with the government. These meetings are 
prepared in direct coordination among the members by the Center. Twice a year a 
meeting is being held that  
“encourages information sharing between INGOs, coordination of their 
activities, lobbying for mutual issues, discussions on policy changes and 
preparation of joint statements on behalf of the INGO community for high-level 
forums and discussions with the government and donors.” (NRC 2010). 
Thus the Center is a main framework for coordination among INGOs in Vietnam and it 
can be summarized by stating that a substantial level of coordination already exists due 
to the work that has been done by the Center. That is a network that connects INGOs 
with each other to facilitate strategic discussions also with other actors and the 
government. This platform gives INGO the opportunity to “coordinate at the operational 
level through the working groups. Within these, they coordinate policy issues, changes 
in laws and decisions that concern their target groups. There is overall coordination on 
the main tasks on INGOs in Vietnam which has been over the last decades poverty 
reduction. Further, they coordinate on all sorts of very specific issues.” (Interviewee 5) 
4.2.2. Rules-in-use for Bi- and Multilateral Organizations  
Regarding the bi- and multilateral donors, figures exist from the OECD (2013a). In 
total, 32 bilateral and 18 multilateral donors delivered aid to Vietnam in 2011. In total 
about 3.5 billion US Dollar of ODA was channeled to Vietnam in this year, of which 
about 1.4 billion came from bilateral sources and 1.1 billion from multilateral sources 
(WB 2013). 9 years earlier, in 2002, only 2 billion US Dollar of ODA found its way to 
Vietnam. This rising number is also reflected in ODA per capita. Even though 
population growth in Vietnam is steady, ODA per capita increased from 16.01 US 
Dollar in 2002 up to 40 US Dollar in 2011. Figure 4 displays this trend since 1960 in 
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relation to GDP per capita. These figures highlight the fact that ODA per capita is 
almost 14 times higher now than it used to be in the 1980s.  
 
Figure 4: GDP and ODA per capita from 1960 until 2011 (in current US Dollars) 
Source: WB (2013) 
This is an important fact if one considers that all this money has to distributed through 
or in cooperation with Vietnamese institutions, be it ministries or local administrations. 
As mentioned previously, it is, however, not a secret that corruption, unqualified 
personnel and inefficiencies in the public sector are a wide spread evil. Combined with 
increasing ODA and a high number of actors in the sector it has significant effects on 
the context that governs cooperation among bi- and multilateral agencies in Vietnam. 
Additionally, the majority of interviewees pointed out that the government is “hardly 
fully aware of what the donors are doing with them or for them” which would be also 
due to “pressure on just a few people in Government that speak English” from many 
donors (Interviewee 1) as well as the many activities they would have to coordinate 
(Interviewee 6). This is also underlined by the afore mentioned lack of progress in the 
area of joint missions, which is putting a heavy burden on the government (OECD 
2013b). However, donors wish that the “government should take a much stronger role to 
coordinate” (Interviewee 2, and clearly Interviewee 4, Interviewee 1, Interviewee 6). 
Even though the wish is strong in the development community, it is far from being 
reality for the mentioned reasons. 
Aside from the abovementioned overall initiatives two more fragmented coordination 
mechanisms have been developed specifically for bi- and multilateral donors.  One is 
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the Like Minded Donor Group (LMDG), which consists of 14 bilateral donors
4
 that are 
active in Vietnam. The group aims at more coordination through communication and a 
better implementation of the Aid Effectiveness Agenda (Embassy of Finland 2013). 
However, their mutual activities are only geared towards developing a first 
understanding of common action areas (WB 2013). Another is a cooperation between 
the Asian Development Bank,  the World Bank, JICA (Japan), Korea Eximbank, AFD 
(France) and KfW (Germany), in the so called 6-Bank Group. Their intention is to 
harmonize their policies in order to have greater impact. 
At least for bi- and multilateral donors possibilities for exchange and coordination in 
several institutionalized platforms exist.   
5. Incentives for Cooperation 
In the survey conducted in Vietnam among decision makers in Vietnam about 
cooperation, the question was asked how intense the participants would rate their 
cooperation with their last partner they were cooperating with. The participants could 
report on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 was low intensity and 5 was high intensity. The 
answer were then grouped into three groups, 1 and 2 into a group ‘Low intensity’, 3 into 
a group ‘medium intensity’ and 4 and 5 into ‘high intensity’. The distribution is listed in 
Table 4.  
Table 4: Intensity of cooperation among respondents 
Absolute Relative
low 1 7.7
medium 4 30.8
high 8 61.5  
The results show that cooperation of the surveyed persons with another organization 
was on average high. This is an interesting result and indicates strong relationships with 
other organizations among the surveyed. This finding is also well in line with the 
opinion of Interviewee 5 who states the cooperation in Vietnam is very intense, better 
than ever before in his entire career. So what are the reasons for that? 
                                                 
4
 Member countries are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom (list from 2010). 
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This chapter analysis incentives on different levels as defined in the theoretical 
framework - intrinsic incentives as well as extrinsic incentives. Where adequate, the 
incentives will be cross tabulated with the intensity of cooperation, which is an indicator 
for how well an incentive for cooperation is working as it is assumed that a strong 
incentive leads to more cooperation.  
5.1 Intrinsic Incentives 
Intrinsic incentives are incentives that create rewards and punishments from within the 
actor. These incentives can create positive or negative situations for cooperation in that 
they push a person towards a certain action because it gives him or her good or bad 
feelings to act a certain way. The ones under investigation here and taken from the 
literature: culture, trust, and the ‘big-five’ of the personality. They will be discussed 
using the data gained through a survey and interviews and enriched by observations of 
the researcher. 
As mentioned previously, interpersonal trust as a maxim is an important intrinsic 
incentive to cooperate. Trust gives an actor the ability to handle interpersonal 
uncertainty that goes along with cooperation (Fink & Kessler 2009). If decision makers 
in donor organization have higher trust, intense cooperation will therefore be easier to 
achieve. To measure trust in the survey, a short scale with three items was used that was 
developed and tested by Beierlein et al (2012) at the GESIS institute.  The result is an 
index that runs from 1 to 5. In test surveys a value of 3.37 (Standard deviation of 0.77) 
has proven to be the average of society. Among the surveyed employees of donors in 
Vietnam the value was 3.89 on average with a standard deviation of 0.71. However, no 
significant relationship with the cooperation intensity was found that could suggest that 
trusting persons cooperate more intensely.  
However, Interviewee 6 highlighted the role of trust: “Of course, actually in Vietnam 
you must create the trust when you are working together. From the beginning it can be 
difficult. But if you know each other very well I think it is easy”. This might indicate 
that it is not the intrinsic trusting attitude of a person as such but rather a reciprocal 
relationship that motivates cooperation. The actors are rewarded for their trusting 
behavior with trust from their counterpart, which then leads to a reinforcing situation.  
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For other personality factors, the so called ‘Big-Five’ measurement scale with 10 items 
was used, that was developed and tested by Rammstedt et al. 2012 also at the GESIS 
institute. The big five describe five abstract characteristics of the personality and is 
widely used in psychology. The five include: extraversion, neuroticism, openness, 
conscientiousness, and agreeableness. Volk et al. (2011) found that agreeableness would 
lead to more coordination as it is a prosocial and communal behavior. There is no 
relationship with any of the mentioned character traits and the cooperation intensity. 
The individual means are listed in table 5 and compared to the test survey.  
Table 5: Means and standard deviation of 'Big-Five' character traits 
Mean
Standard 
Deviation Mean
Standard 
Deviation
extraversion 3.46 1.07 3.47 0.95
neuroticism 2.19 0.93 2.43 0.88
openness 3.38 0.92 3.41 0.93
conscientiousness 4.12 0.77 4.15 0.79
agreeableness 4.12 0.87 3.45 0.80
Test SurveySurvey in Vietnam
 
It is interesting that the value for agreeableness among the surveyed persons is the only 
one that is significantly higher than the one in the test survey. Considering the high 
cooperation intensity among the surveyed decision makers, this in an interesting 
relationship.  
When asked in the survey whether personality would be a problem for communication, 
9 people responded ‘almost never’ and 4 agreed. This indicates that it does not seem to 
be a problem for communication but it plays a role in general. This is underlined by the 
fact that most of the interviewees pointed out that the personality of their counterpart is 
a factor that would influence the cooperation relationship. For interviewee 6 it is a 
“contributing factor” where, if the other person would have an open and sharing 
attitude, it would be easier to communicate with each other and to scale up the 
cooperation. It can thus be perceived as only a little part of the puzzle that reinforces the 
relationship. Interviewee 3 agrees with that position but also adds the cultural factor, 
which would lead to problems in interacting.  
Culture as an intrinsic incentive is hard to define. Culture as such does not lead one to a 
certain behavior. But there are certain aspects that are associated with culture that come 
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with the socialization process as Chen et al. (1998) highlights in a study about how 
individualism and collectivism as prevailing concepts in different cultures effect 
cooperation. Thus, culture in this thesis is used as a general term that has to be, if 
investigated in detail, carefully broken down in its elements. This being said, it is in the 
context of this exploratory approach a first step. In the survey respondents were asked in 
which country they grew up mainly. These countries were then grouped into an Asian 
and a European category, representing the different cultural backgrounds of a person. 
Within the Asian group 80% of respondents replied that their cooperation was intense, 
within the European group only 50% replied that their cooperation was intense.  
As indicated further above it might not be only the intrinsic incentive but also a 
reinforcing situation that lead to better communication. The respondents were asked in 
the survey whether they had problems with communicating with their counterpart 
because of cultural differences. The results were coded with ‘almost never’ and ‘more 
than random’. 11 people answered that they almost never had problems with cultural 
differences
5
. However, in the remaining two cases who reported that they had problems, 
cooperation intensity was low. These results indicate that culture usually doesn’t play a 
role as whatsoever incentive. This is underlined that no interviewee but one said that it 
is of importance for good cooperation.  
It can be summarized that culture itself is not a strong incentive as such. Rather 
personality and trust can be perceived as a contributing factor to better coordination, 
indicated by their high value compared to test surveys. Furthermore, there are no 
indications for purely intrinsic incentives for cooperation that come from trust or 
personality. Rather the relationship seems to be reinforcing: personality and trust do 
lead to better coordination if personality and trust reinforce the relationship positively.  
5.2 Extrinsic Incentives for Cooperation 
Extrinsic incentives are rewards and punishments external to the actor. Thus, a certain 
action is motivated due to external stimuli. The cooperation literature suggests a number 
of incentives that could be helpful to motivate cooperation. 
                                                 
5
 Out of the four items asked about communication problems due to different factors, this is the item with 
which respondents agreed the least! 
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5.2.1. Incentives from the Interaction with Other Donors 
Casey (2007) highlights that equal cooperation relationship are by far more successful 
than unequal ones. He defines equality as equity. The reason would be, among others, 
that unequal partnerships would produce mistrust which would lead to less cooperation. 
In the survey respondents were asked whether their partnership is equal. 10 responded 
with yes and 3 with no. Furthermore, a cross tabulation indicated that people who 
responded with yes also reported higher cooperation intensities. Interviewee 7 also 
highlighted that equality for her/him means that communication is an open process and 
that everything is theoretically possible. That would first of all mean that “Before 
entering the relationship we need to discuss very deeply our expectations and their 
expectations and this is an open process.”  
Another incentive suggested by Atouba & Shumate (2010: 296) is exchange ties of 
resources. They argue that donors “may minimize dependence asymmetries” by seeking 
resource exchange ties because reciprocal dependency would lead to higher trust and 
more cooperation. The researcher in this case argues that with more exchange ties, trust 
is enhanced, and the actor has the natural incentive to cooperate more closely as he or 
she has more to gain than to lose. In the survey in Vietnam the questions was as asked 
what kind of resources the actors would gain access to when cooperating with another 
donor. The results were: Money (3), knowledge (10), workforce (2), or Experience (9). 
An index was computed that indicated how many options were chosen by one 
respondent. One option was chosen four times, two options were chosen seven times 
and three options were chosen twice. This is assumed to reflect the total number of 
exchange ties by one person. This was cross tabulated with the cooperation intensity 
and showed no results. Therefore a high number of exchange ties do not necessarily 
have to be a incentives for the surveyed persons to cooperate more closely.  
However, the high mentioning of knowledge and experience is noteworthy. Interviewee 
3 states that knowledge is so important in this business that everyone needs it. To 
engage in an exchange with others would be mainly for this information. Interviewee 1 
underlines that and emphasize that the big question would be “How free are you with 
sharing that information”? This suggests a situation where actors, for strategically 
reasons sometimes don’t share information, especially among bi- and multilateral 
organizations. However, the interviewee points out that information sharing can be a 
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first step towards more cooperation. Are there any incentives from within an 
organization that can stimulate information sharing? 
5.2.2. Incentives from within the Organization 
In this regard guidelines for cooperation can be an incentive for decision makers in 
organizations to cooperate more intensely. 10 persons report to have such a guideline. 
Interviewee 7 pointed out that it would be of importance to have such a guideline as it 
would standardize and ease procedures. If these procedures would additionally be 
mutual, organizations would be able to cooperate according to shared rules and no 
organization could withdraw from set up rules. Interviewee 8 has the opinion that rules 
are necessary to define expectations. If everyone would act according to known rules, 
defection would not as easily be possible. Thus, this would be a positive incentive for 
cooperation. Also, in the survey the people were asked if they ever had problems in 
communicating with their counterpart due to different internal procedures. 7 decision 
makers answered yes and 6 no. Out of the four items asked to communication problems 
this one was agreed upon the most. Guidelines are thus not only helpful, but common 
guidelines would ease communication and thus cooperation.  
However, this would need a strong support for cooperation within the organization as 
this is where guidelines are developed. In the survey participants were asked whether 
they ever had to report about their cooperation activities to someone else. In donor 
organizations reporting is a tool to monitor a certain process from the headquarters or 
somewhere remotely. Only 8 answered yes, indicating that cooperation as mechanism is 
not yet as important as other issues decision makers have to report about and that it is 
not yet build within standard operation procedures within the organization. The reality 
is that in most procurement documents donors have to describe the context of their 
project, including activities of others and how the own project can contribute as well as 
where are likely areas for cooperation. As long as reporting mechanism regarding 
cooperation opportunities, linked to proposed activities, are not strongly demanded from 
decision makers, cooperation is not taken seriously. Interviewee 1 reports that donors 
“have been copying each other’s description of the context” instead of developing own 
opportunities for cooperation. 
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The support of a superior is also perceived to be an incentive to cooperate. If an actor 
has pressure, or at least the support, of his senior manager he or she will weigh the 
advantage of cooperation higher than the costs. 10 people answered that their superior 
gives them full support. However, as Interviewee 4 points out, different approaches to 
integrating the success of cooperation into performance reviews of employees exist. 
Thus, support might exist; strong financial rewards however are not always in place. 
5.2.3. Incentives with regard to Resources 
Highlighted by all interviewed persons were the timely and financial restrictions one 
would face with regards to making successful cooperation possible. Coyle and Lawson 
(2006) point out that the pressure to disburse money would lead to a devaluation of the 
role of cooperation. Interviewee 1 explains the link as follows: “if you would follow 
donor coordination to the root then as a donor agency, at one point, you could say, well, 
I have made my survey of what my fellow organizations are doing, and I have got to 
take the conclusion that there is no place for me.”. Even if this comment is not 
interpreted in its full extent, donor coordination as such also means sometimes not to 
engage in certain activities as they wouldn’t bring an advantage to the country one is 
working in. According to Interviewee 4 this is due to will to survive in this competing 
system with scarce resources. As no one would willingly risk their jobs with refusing a 
job or not proposing yet another project, there is no incentive for actual coordination. 
When asked in the survey whether the amount of work required of them is a lot, 9 
people strongly agreed, one person was neutral and 3 persons didn’t agree. No 
relationship was found with cooperation intensity. However, Interviewee 7 mentions 
that “we also feel that sometime it is quite a challenge. For instance a big proposal is 
coming and then the timeline is very sharp. And we try to contact some NGOs whether 
they can be in the cooperation but there is just not enough time.” But also the mentioned 
initiatives like the LMDG meetings and CG meetings take time. In this regard, 
Interviewee 4 mentions that “people are overwhelmed by their own individual tasks. So 
they may not want to make extra effort to attend in the donor cooperation, because it 
takes time.”. It is thus obvious that actors have only limited time available and that no 
incentives exist to spend time with coordination. This finding is closely linked with 
other findings from above and will be discusses in the next chapter.  
-41- 
6. Discussion 
Indications were found that personality and trust are intrinsic incentives for cooperation, 
based on the statements in interviewees and the on average high value of agreeableness 
and trust among respondents compared to test surveys. It might be that people working 
in development aid are in general more trustful and agreeable because of what their job 
demands from them. Thus, those factors would not be the sole incentives for 
cooperation as everyone would have these characteristics. However, it also could be that 
respondents in this survey had on average high values, meaning that the high value of 
cooperation intensity could indeed be incent by trust and personality. In this case it is 
trust that helps actors to handle interpersonal uncertainty that goes along with 
cooperation, and agreeableness that is an incentive because of the prosocial and 
communal behavior it motivates. It might be worthwhile to check that finding against 
further research.   
As was pointed out, equal partnerships lead to less mistrust. There was an indication 
that this holds true in the case of Vietnam. Equality then means that communication 
between partners first of all gives both partners the same opportunity to mention their 
expectations regarding the cooperation and therefore reduce mistrust.  
Exchange ties seemed not to play a role as an incentive. However, it was also indicated 
that the opportunity for information sharing seems to be an incentive that can lead to 
more cooperation. NGOs that were interviewed were quite convinced that information 
sharing is working in Vietnam and the researcher points in this case to the positively 
perceived role of the NGO Resource Center, whose role is to facilitate information 
exchange and which is unique in the world. From activities of the Center more 
sophisticated cooperation relationships have evolved (Interviewee 5). However, there 
seems to be room for improvement with regard to information sharing among bi- and 
multilateral organizations, even though the rules-in-use (Paris Agenda and local groups) 
encourage it. These rules are quiet strong in Vietnam. In this context it was pointed out 
that organizations are sometimes, for strategic reasons, not so free to exchange 
information and this could only be altered by altering incentives from within 
organizations. However, information exchange can have a initial role for cooperation.  
-42- 
Such an incentive under investigation were guidelines. The analysis suggest that 
guidelines are of importance as they would ease communication between cooperation 
partners and thus would be an incentive for actors to cooperate. In most cases they are 
in place. Common guidelines that elaborate the Paris Agenda or even specify local 
cooperation mechanisms could help to structure the action situation in a new and 
positive way regarding the cooperation intensity. However, guidelines are developed 
within organizations and strong support for cooperation in general is naturally a 
prerequisite for developing such guidelines. As long as this support is not given 
cooperation is only progressing slowly. Missing support was indicated by the missing 
reporting structures within organizations. It can be argued that, as long as strong 
reporting structures are not in place, cooperation is not taken seriously as the wrong 
signals are sent by the organization system. It might help a little that support from 
superiors is given, as was indicated by respondents in the survey. But support does not 
necessarily have to be an incentive. It can just as easily be ignored by a rational actor. 
Thus, guidelines and reporting mechanisms that support cooperation, are incentives that 
have to be further investigated, as supported by statements of interviewees. 
Time restrictions were emphasized by most interviewees and the survey as a constraint 
to cooperation. This argument goes hand in hand with missing guidelines and reporting 
mechanisms for cooperation. As long as these mechanisms are not in place, no time 
spots will be allocated by a rational actor. It is thus no surprise that opportunities for 
information sharing are used frequently and that institutions like the NGO Resource 
Center are positively evaluated because information sharing as such is not a time 
consuming activity. Another aspect is the pressure to disburse money, also related to 
other incentives that were under investigation. Wherever disbursement considerations 
override coordination decisions, it is a structural incentive within the organization that 
leads to this. The structures can be found, as pointed out by interviewees, in the will of 
the organization to survive. Less projects mean less funds in the next year, less impact 
and finally less jobs, which could also affect the ones who make the decisions whether 
to cooperate or not, the decision makers an actors in question here. However, as it is the 
case with lack of time, guidelines and reporting mechanisms can help to solve this 
situation as well. 
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Thus, it might be time to refer the discussion to the next level, where collective choices 
are made that directly influence the level that was analyzed. This would have the 
advantage to discuss about the structure and incentives within the action arena that 
defines the discussed incentives. Here such issues like the drafting of guidelines could 
be discussed and incentives within the organizations play a role. One could even go one 
step further on the constitutional level where the rules of the game are made. Why is 
there so much pressure to disburse money? Is it because development organizations are 
just another tool for foreign policy and thus never will be really cooperating? 
To remain on this level of analysis the following hypothesis should be considered in 
further research: 
H1: Trust and personality do play a role in motivating cooperation among donors. Thus, 
intrinsic incentives are important factors for cooperation. 
H2: An open process before the beginning of a cooperation relationship to which both 
partners can equally contribute in order to define expectation is a positive incentive for 
cooperation. 
H3: Opportunities for knowledge exchange can be a positive incentive for further 
cooperation. 
H4: Guidelines and reporting mechanisms that support cooperation motivate actors to 
cooperate more. 
7. Limitations 
Limitations arise due to the (very) unexpected low response rate in the survey for which 
reasons are unknown, although poor accessibility may have been a contributing factor. 
Though, low n does not pose a problem to this research as a qualitative framework is 
used. However, the low n of all participants combined (survey and interviews) is a 
serious challenge when interpreting the data as structurally more similar respondents 
and a better distribution of answers would have allowed for better condensing patterns 
in the data. In general it can be said that deducing patterns from the given data is hard. 
However, considering that the exploratory attempt in this study it is a first and sufficient 
step.  
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Furthermore, due to the professionalism and position of the interviewees it was hard to 
get thorough and clear answer to the questions that were asked. Interviewees, that was 
the impression of the researcher, didn’t clearly state their problems with cooperation. In 
most cases it seemed to be hard to question already given structures and thus get good 
insights into cooperation structures and their underlying reasons. Due to the very tight 
budget and time restrictions of the researcher it was not possible to investigate the topic 
more in detail, meaning to get more interviews and triangulate data even more. 
However, the topic is of importance to donors and it is the strong opinion of the 
researcher that a first investigation into cooperation in Vietnam was necessary and that 
the gained data is relevant.  
Another limitation arises formally through the fact that cooperation as such is not 
defined and was defined by respondents in different ways. Every research that makes 
use of an indicator such as the intensity of cooperation will face this problem, if not 
standardized measures are developed. However, this is a problem of ontology in 
general. Or in other more broadly: whether the concept under investigation really exists 
and is also perceived the same way as the researcher did. 
8. Conclusion 
Using the IAD framework by Elinor Ostrom a case study in Vietnam was conducted to 
explore incentives for cooperation among donors. As a result four hypotheses were 
developed from the findings that need further investigation: trust and personality, an 
open and equal communication process to define expatiations before starting 
cooperation relationships, creating opportunities for knowledge exchange and 
guidelines and reporting mechanisms that support cooperation. Theory was applied that 
so far was only used in cooperation literature outside of development cooperation. 
Further, incentives within the actor (intrinsic incentives) could be identified, which is a 
new approach to cooperation in development aid. Furthermore, the special situation of 
Vietnam was analyzed. The thesis concludes with an encouraging message to those who 
want to investigate the developed hypothesis more in detail.  
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shared goals 8
common purpose 8
mutual respect 11
willingness to negotiate 7
informed participation 9
information giving 8
shared descision making 6
sharing power 1
long term 5
close 1
voluntary 5
pooled ressources 5
access to knowledge 10
reduce uncertainty 2
division of labor 4
more communication 7
encouraging each other 4
key for survival 1
cost minimization 6
legally binding 3
Appendix 
Annex 1: Definition of cooperation 
In the survey two item batteries were used to develop an understanding of a definition 
of cooperation. One battery asked the respondents to rank five statements about 
cooperation according to their intensity. The findings are listed in this table:  
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5
informal and sporadic communication 7 0 0 3 3
Signing a cooperation agreement 3 4 3 1 2
Observing the work of other donors and adjusting own project 0 3 1 4 5
Having regular meetings and exchaning experience 2 4 4 3 0
Jointly collecting data 1 2 5 2 3  
The second question related to 20 statements about cooperation. The respondents were 
asked to tick the statements that applied. Thus, several of these statements could be 
included in a definition. They are listed in the following table: 
One option is to now include the five items that were 
mentioned the most in a definition. Therefore, 
cooperation could be defined as: having a common 
purpose and shared goals, that is build on mutual 
respect and works with informed participation, 
information giving and provides access to knowledge.  
Cooperation seems to be rather informal than formal 
and knowledge exchange is important. However, the 
most important finding from this experiment is that a 
mutual definition of cooperation does not exist. 
 
 
 
-50- 
Annex 2: Coding Scheme 
 
 Forms of Cooperation: organizations and intensity 
o Formal  
o Informal  
o Organizations and intensity of cooperation with them 
o Preferred form of cooperation 
 Could you describe how cooperation depends on the environment it is set in? Does cooperation 
looks similar in every country? 
o Projects 
o Vietnamese context 
o Other donors? 
 Framework and attitude in the Organization regarding cooperation 
o Do they exist? 
o Are they clear? 
o Ideas for improvement - What would you say is a good framework 
o Is there a higher ideal which supports cooperation  
o Is there a method to assess the need for cooperation 
o Who supports cooperation, who is opposed to it? 
 Resources in the Organization regarding cooperation 
o Are enough resources allocated for cooperation (time, money, knowledge)  
o Not enough information available about actors, programs  
 Self conception 
o Independence and room to maneuver  
o Organizations lose their competitive advantages if they cooperate 
o Instinct of self preservation of organization 
 Personality and characteristics of the decision maker 
o Is it important? 
o Age, cultural background, ego, introverted/extroverted 
o Fear to lose own competitive advantage on the personal level 
 Importance of the project/programme/organization for cooperation 
o Complexity – sectors the project is related to 
o Differences between NGOs and International Organizations 
o Reasons for differences  
 Characteristics and evaluation of the relationship 
o Communication and problems associated with communication 
 How could cooperation be improved?  
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Annex 3: Print Version of the questionnaire (online version slightly different) 
 
[]Cooperation can vary along various dimensions. One is the intensity of
cooperation. Please rank the following five items, starting with the most intense
cooperation. *
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Cooperation Description
[]
The following questions are about the how and why of your cooperation activity
with an other international donor organization. Please describe a cooperation in
which you personally took part and that was/is specific, meaning restricted
thematically and timely (e.g. to a programme that run for 5 years).
Please choose your LAST cooperation with an international donor, even if it is still
ongoing. If you have several cooperation activities at the moment, choose the
partner organization with which you started the cooperation first. Please use
your own definition of cooperation to choose the organization.
Now, what is your experience with cooperation?
[]Please enter the name of the organization
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[]Cooperation can vary according to its intensity. On a scale ranging from 1 to 5
where 1 is low intensity and 5 is high intensity, how intense is/was the
cooperation? *
       
      N O P Q N O R           J   S L
T
U
V
W
X
     J         K         S          K
[]Does the donor organization you are cooperating with receive its funds from
the same donor (e.g. the same government or the same international support
structure)? *
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[]Please describe the quality of the cooperation with a scale ranging from 1 to 5
where 1 is low quality and 5 is high quality *
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[]In what sector is the cooperation mainly taking place? *
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[]Interactions are not always equal. In this cooperation, which organisation has
more influence on the interaction? *
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[]How much do you agree with the follwing statements? *
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[]On average, how many times do you communicate with the organization you
cooperate with? *
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[]How many times did you have problems with the following aspects during an
interaction with your partner organization? *
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[]Compared to your organization, how can you describe the objectives (of their
projects) of the organization you are cooperating with? *
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[]How would you describe your personal relationship with your counterpart at
the other organization? *
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[]Cooperation can give you access to resources. What kind of resources did your
organization gain through that cooperation? *
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Organization
[]The following questions are about the organization you are working for. *
[]What kind of organization are you currently working for? *
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[]How many employees does your organization have? *
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[]In what sector is your organization active? *
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[]From which country is your organization originally from? *
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[]Did your senior manager/superior actively encourage you to engage in
cooperation with other organizations? *
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[]Did you ever receive training in your professional life on how to cooperate with
other donors? *
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[]How would you assess the support for cooperation from co-workers in your
organization? *
       
      N O P Q N O R           J   S L
3  ' % ﬃ "     #
.
"     #
Z & " #  ﬀ ﬁ
h    # & ﬂ ﬃ "     #
Z  ﬃ "     #
[]Are you aware of a policy or a guideline within your organisation that promotes
or regulates cooperation with other organizations? *
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[]Do you think you have enough room to maneuver regarding your freedom to
decide when, where and how you can engage in cooperation? *
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[]Have you ever been asked to report your experience with
coordination/harmonisation of aid to someone within your organization? *
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[]
Please indicate in how far you agree with this statement, using a scale ranging
from 1 to 5 where 1 is don't agree at all and 5 is fully agree.
  *
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Personal
[]Before we finish, please answer these questions about you. Let me remind you
that this survey is completely anonymous. Thank you for your help!
[]For how many years have you been working in the field of development
cooperation? *
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[]The next questions are about your attitude towards other people. Please
indicate to what extent you
agree with each statement. *
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[]In which country were you born and raised (mainly)? *
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[]In which year were you born? *
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[]How well do the following statements describe your personality? *
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Which of the following best describes you? *
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[]What is the name of your organization?
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[]People have differing opinions about how to define cooperation. Please choose
the options you would like to include in a definition of cooperation *
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Drawing and Results
[]Please let me know your mail address for the drawing as well as if you would
like to receive the results. The following information will be stored separately to
the rest of the answers in this survey. The addresses will be destroyed right after
the drawing and right after the results have been send out.
[]Would you like to receive the results of the study?
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[]Would you like to participate in the drawing for one of ten vouchers for Joma
Bakery?
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